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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LAWSON SUPPLY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
GENERAL PLUMBING & HEATING
INC., a corporation, E. KEITH
LIGNELL and BURTON M. TODD,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12362

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by plaintiff-respondent
to recover for materials supplied and incorporated in the
apartment houses built for defendants-appellants Lignell
and Todd at 247 South 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah
for which plaintiff had not been paid.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff was granted judgment against the defendant General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. for $9,435.51
plus interest from August 14, 1969 and costs. (R. 55).

I

The court denied enforcement cif the mechanic's lien
claimed against the property by pbint;ff on the ground
that the notice of lien ,,·as not timely filed. (I\. 96-8, 75).
The court granted judgment against owner defendants
Lignell and Todd on the personal liability created by the
provisions of 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953 as amended by Laws of
Utah 1965, Chapter 24, Sec. 1 ct seq. because of their failure to require a bond of the contractor as required by
14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. Judgment was in the
amount of $8,200.20 plus interest of $615.00 to the date of
judgment and costs in the amount of $140.90. CR. 75,
76, 99). Defendants Lignell and Todd's motion to amend
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment and
to tax costs was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower
court awarding relief to the plaintiff against the defendants Lignell and Todd affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is not in accord with some of the appellants' statement of facts and will accordingly re-state the
facts as plaintiff understands them to be and as supported
by the record.
Defendants E. Keith Lignell and Burton M. Todd
entered into a contract with Clifford Berg to construct an
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apartment complex on land owned by Lignell and Todd
at 247 South 7th East in Salt Lake City, Utah. <R. 116
Ex. P.2). The contract was for a total consideration of
$460,000.00. (Ex. P.2). Berg entered into a verbal subcontract with General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. to do
the plumbing portion of the contract including installation of fixtures. <R. 212). Plaintiff made a quotation to
supply certain of the materials necessary to the plumbing
job to General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. <R. 182 Ex.
P.6). Plaintiff supplied the materials called for to General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. at the prices on the revised quote. <R. 182 Ex. P.6). The material was invoiced to the particular job. (R. 146 Ex. P.4). The name
Globe Enterprises or Investment refers to a partnership
between Lignell and Todd. <R. 121). All of the material
for which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendants Todd
and Lignell was in fact delivered to and incorporated into
the apartment complex constructed for said defendants.
<R. 202,3). The invoices identifying the material and the
job were carried by invoice number into the ledger accounts of plaintiff with General Plumbing and Heating,
Inc. from which it was possible thereby to ascertain the
job for which the material was supplied and used. <R.
161). Payments made by General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. were credited to oldest invoice on the ledger unless otherwise specified by General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. <R. 164). Utilizing this accounting system the
General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. owed plaintiff nothing as of October 1968. <R. 197). The plaintiff credited
to the job for defendants all payments made by General
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. except the sum of $185.99
which was applied to charges for materials used on an3

other job. (R. 158). The 111;1t0rial ''as furnished by
plaintiff to the particular j:)b and ',', c1s 11nt sold on simply
the credit of General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. which,
other than for this job, had not in many years purchased
materials resulting in an account balance exceeding
$2400.00. (R. 171). General Plumbing and Heating
paid for part of the materials used on this job but did not
pay for the balance of $8,200.20, and is now insolvent.
<R. 186, 193 Ex. P-12, 155 Ex. P-5). Defendants Lignell
and Todd as owners of the property improved had not
required that bond be given as by 14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as
amended, required. (R.3, 4 & 35, 115, 116, Appellants'
Brief pg. 2).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS LIGNELL AND TODD ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF UNDER THE
TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953
AS AMENDED FOR MATERIALS FURNISHED BY
PLAINTIFF AND INCORPORATED INTO THE IMPROVEMENTS
CONSTRUCTED
ON
LANDS
OWNED BY DEFENDANTS UNDER AND BY
VIRTUE OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND CLIFFORD BERG.
Defendants are the owners of hnd located at 247
South 7th East in Salt Lake City, Utah. CR. 114, 121).
Defendants contracted with one Clifford Berg to construct for them upon the lands owned by them at the address aforesaid an apartment complex for a total contract
consideration of $460,000.00. <R. 121 Ex. P-2). Berg, as
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general contractor, entered into an oral sub-contract with
General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. to do the plumbing
portion of the contract. (R. 212). Plaintiff had supplied
to General Plumbing and Heating a quote for some of
the plumbing material on this particular job. <R. 159 Ex.
P-6). The apartment complex was built and the General
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. received materials from the
plaintiff which were incorporated into the job for the defendants <R. 202, 3 Ex. P-4) upon which a balance remains due, owing and unpaid to plaintiff of $8,200.20.
<R. 185,6, Ex. P-5). Defendants did not require a bond
to protect labor and materialmen as required by 14-2-1
U.C.A. 1953 as amended. (R. 3, 4, 5, 35, ll5, 116, Ap.
pellants' Brief pg. 2).
The applicable provisions of the Utah Code are:
14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as amended:
"14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. - The owner of any interest in land
entering into a contract, involving $500 or more,
for the construction, addition to, or alteration or
repair of, any building, structure or improvement
upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a
sum equal to the contract price, with good and
sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for
material furnished and labor performed under the
contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and
to all other persons as their interest may appear;
and any person who has furnished materials or
performed labor for or upon any such building,
structure or improvement, payment for which has
not been made, shall have a direct right of action
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against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case
the prices agreed upon; which right of action shall
accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or default in the performance, of the
work provided for in the contract.
"The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request."
14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953 as amended by Ch. 24 Sec. 1
Laws of Utah 1965:
"14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct
liability. - Any person subject to the provisions
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good
and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as
herein required, shall be personally liable to all
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case
the prices agreed upon."
The basic statutory provisions quoted have been part
of the law of this state for many years and have been previously interpreted by this court. The case of Liberty
Coal and Lumber Co. v. Snow decided by this court in
1919 stated the purposes of the legislative enactment in
these terms:
"That agreement, as we construe the statute,
comes clearly within its terms, and in failing to
obtain a bond appellant became liable for the
reasonable value of the materials furnished for,
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and the labor performed on, the dwelling. In
order to construe the statute so as not to cover a
case like the one at bar the language thereof must
be unreasonably restricted. The statute does not
concern itself with the legal relationship of the
parties; that is, it is quite immaterial whether the
agreement to construct a building upon land is
made between the owner thereof and the contractor, or between the owner and the builder,
or between him and his tenant, or between him
and any other person; but if the owner of the land
contracts for the construction of a building on
his land, the statute makes it his duty to comply
with its terms if he desires to escape personal liability. The purpose of the statute is to prevent
the owners of land from having their lands improved with the materials and labor furnished
and performed by third persons, and thus to enhance the value of such lands, without becoming
personally responsible for the reasonable value of
the materials and labor which enhances the value
of those lands. The owner may, however, escape
personal liability by obtaining the bond required
by the statute." Liberty Coal and Lumber Co. v.
Snow, 53, Utah 298, 178 P. 341.
That this is sdll the purpose of the statute is recognized by this court in the case of Crane Co. v. Utah
Motor Park Inc. decided Feb. 27, 1959, 8 Utah 2d 413,
335 P2d 837 where the court, citing the Liberty Coal and
Lumber Co. case stated:
"The purpose of the mechanics' and materialmen' s lien statutes and likewise the statutes
quoted hereinabove, is to prevent the owners of
land from having their lands improved with the
materials and labor furnished and performed by
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third persons, and thus to enhance the value of
such lands, without becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of the materials and
labor which enhance the value of those lands. The
owner may escape personal liability by obtaining
the bond as required by the statute."
Plaintiff's invoices and the testimony clearly showed that
the material for which recovery is here sought against
defendants Lignell and Todd was ordered for this particular job, delivered to the job and incorporated into the
job. <R. 202, 203, Ex. P-4, P-5). Defendants do not dispute this fact. Defendants' entire defense in this action
is based upon a misconstruction by defendants of the decision of this court in the case of Crown Roofing and Engineering Company v. Robinson, 19 Utah 2d 417, 432
P. 2d 47. Defendants find that case on all fours with the
facts in the instant case. Plaintiff finds no similarity. In
the Crown Roofing case the fact was that Crown Roofing
supplied materials in great quantity to the Reliable Roofing Company on open account without reference to any
particular use to be made of the product. Reliable Roofing was a large contractor and consumer of roofing supplies which were for the most part delivered to its warehouses by several different suppliers of which the Crown
Roofing was one. After Reliable Roofing Company became insolvent and unable to meet the demands of its
creditors the Crown Roofing claimed to have delivered a
few shingles on a specific housing job being performed
for the defendant in the action and by thereafter estimating the quantities of material which were required to do
the job attempted to fix responsibility on the owners
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under the bonding statute for the materials used on the
job. This court said:
"The foregoing evidence indicates the nature
of the relationship between the subcontractor and
the plaintiff. The subcontractor purchased the
bulk of his materials from plaintiff, which he
used in his business generally, and plaintiff, without regard to the subcontractor's use of them, simply maintained an open account to reflect the purchases. There is no evidence that the supplier was
furnishing the material under any specific contract for the construction of a home. Under these
circumstances, the fact that plaintiff delivered
some shingles directly to the job site is not a controlling factor; therefore, the trial court was justified in finding plaintiff not to be a materialman."
In the instant case defendants seek to argue that
because plaintiff did not maintain a separate ledger sheet
on each job of the General Plumbing and Heating, Inc.
that, therefore, this was an "open account" within the
meaning of the language above quoted from the Crown
Roofing Case and plaintiff is not entitled to the protection of the bonding statute. Such a distortion would negate the entire purpose of the bonding statute. In the
case here presented every dollar's worth of material was
charged out to the particular job. <R. Ex. P-4). The
prices were determined from a particular quote made to
the particular job. <R. Ex. P-6}. The charges were carried into the ledger account with the invoice number from
which it was possible to ascertain the job on which the
material had been used. (R. 151-157, Ex. P-5, 7, 8, 9).
The ledger showed that as late as October 1968 the
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account of the General Plumbing :md I Tcating, Inc. with
The contract
plaintiff had been paid in full. ( R I
for this job is dated April 2-t, HJ68. ( R. Ex. P-2). Defendants cry loudly about the practice followed by plaintiff of crediting payments to the oldest invoice. The evidence is undisputed that there were only two payments
made which were in question. On direct examination the
secretary of the plaintiff testified,

"Q. Now, can you tell us the date on which
payment was made?
A. Yes, I can.

Q. Will you do so, please?

A. There are only two payments involved.
The first was made on February 25, 1969 by a
General Plumbing Company check in the amount
of $3000.

Q.

Now, to what was that applied?
A. That was applied to the oldest balance,
which resulted in following: Out of $3000 the invoices that were not on the Globe Job totaled
$172.94. The invoices that were on the Globe job
totaled $2827 .06, which brings you back to the
$3000.

Q.

Now, was there any other payment

Q.

And how was that applied?
That was applied to the oldest balance.

made?
A. There was one other payment on June
16, 1969, a General Plumbing Company check in
the amount of $858.16.
A.

Q. And what did that result in insofar as
relates to the Globe Investment Company job?
10

A. The invoice, by applying it to the oldest
invoice, all the invoices were Globe with the exception of $13.05. So $845.11 went against the
Globe job, and $13.05 went against some other
job." (R. 158).
There was no dispute between plaintiff and defendants
as to the value of the material furnished by plaintiff to the
job and incorporated therein. There can be no doubt that
the plaintiff in this case is a materialman within the
meaning of the statutes cited and is entitled to recover
against the defendants Lignell and Todd for the materials
proved to have been supplied by plaintiff and which were
incorporated into the job constructed on defendants'
land, and for which plaintiff has not been paid. In the
Conclusion of defendants' -appellants' Brief defendants assert that the Crown Roofing case was not properly understood by the trial judge. (App. Brief pg. 18). To the
contrary, we submit that a reading of Judge Hyde's Memorandum Decision (R. 222, 224) clearly reflects his thorough and complete comprehension of that decision and
that he correctly applied the law to the facts in the instant
case. Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory protection.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE JUDGMENT OF
THE LOWER COURT TAXING COSTS AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS INCLUDING COSTS OF TAKING THE DEPOSITIONS OF BERG, AND LIGNELL
AND TODD.
Plaintiff submitted a memorandum of costs to the
lower court in which it claimed as taxable costs the ex-
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pense of taking the depositions d Burton M. Todd, E.
Keith Lignell and of Clifford M. Berg. Defendants assailed the ruling of the court so taxing the costs and filed
an objection thereto seeking to have costs re-taxed by the
eliminating the cost of the depositions in question.
Plaintiff relied on the case of Thomas v. Children's Aid
Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029, wherein this
court held:
"With respect to the cross-appeal of the defendant, we have examined the items which the
trial judge struck from the memorandum of costs
amounting to $304.40. The items consisted of
expenses incurred in the taking of depositions and
securing certified copies of a marriage license and
a divorce decree. No question was made as to the
good faith of defendant in incurring these costs
and they appear to be reasonable. They should
have been allowed as a matter of course.
"Judgment affirmed with instructions to reinstate the items of cost which were stricken from
defendant's memorandum of costs. Costs awarded
to defendant."
In attempting to defeat plaintiff's right to this item,
the defendants overlook two most important factors. The
depositions were all of value to all parties in the trial in
question. Plaintiff sought to use the deposition of Dr.
Lignell in cross examination of Dr. Lignell. But prior to
any motion by plaintiff, the defendants moved the publication of all of the depositions. ( R. 131). Dr. Todd did
not testify at the trial and had it not been for the deposition which had previously been taken, the stipulation as
12

to his testimony would have been impossible. (R. 143).
The deposition of Dr. Lignell was used in his cross
examination. <R. 131-2).
From the standpoint of justice and equity it seems
only right that when a deposition is required in good
faith in preparation for litigation to obtain information
which lies within the control and knowledge of the opponent or other witness, the cost of this preparation
should be taxed as costs. Indeed unless the court does
recognize that this should be the rule, the effectiveness of
our entire system of jurisprudence may fail. In many
cases the cost of preparation for litigation has become so
substantial that even though the litigant is successful, if
he may not be repaid for the costs of obtaining the information necessary to the proper presentation of his case
to the court, he is the ultimate loser. This in effect deprives the successful litigant of his just dues. Litigants
embarking upon litigation should be aware of the fact
that in determining upon that course as a solution to their
problem they may not only incur the expense of their own
preparation but as well the expense they impose upon the
opposing party. This would be a substantial deterrent to
frivolous and unmeritorious litigation. Plaintiff believes
that the decision of Judge Hyde as stated in his Memorandum Decision is correct and should be sustained:

"In the phrasing of Thomas v. Children's
Aid Society of Ogden, 12 U2d 235, 364 P2d 1029,

'No question was made as to the good faith of
defendants in incurring these costs and they appear to be reasonable. They should be allowed as a
matter of course.' " (R. 70).
13

CONCLUSION
The decision of the lmvcr court correctly interprets
and applies the law and is just and equitable. It should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
IRWIN ARNOVITZ
ALLEN H. TIBBALS
604 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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